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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to compare the consequences of, first, quantity 
leadership, and, second, price leadership competition of duopolists for their R&D 
investments, within the situation of a cartelized industry. Using game-theoretical 
approach and numerical analysis, it turns out that under quantity leadership, the 
R&D investments of enterprises decline with the increasing knowledge spillovers 
in the industry. The relative R&D expenditures of the Stackelberg follower are 
lower and they decline significantly faster than the R&D investments of the 
Stackelberg leader. Each enterprise supplies the lowest value of the final product 
when a research joint venture is formed, which also results in the highest market 
price. Under price leadership, a larger extent of knowledge spillovers in the 
industry leads to the reduction of R&D expenditures by both enterprises. The 
highest price of the final product is set when a research joint venture is formed. In 
a cartelized industry, the lowest values of R&D expenditures occur when there are 
no knowledge spillovers between enterprises, or when they form a research joint 
venture at the R&D stage. The highest values of R&D investments are observed for 
the medium values of knowledge spillovers. Performed analysis allows to conclude 
that tightening of cooperation in research and development between competitors 
creates incentives for them to fully cartelize the market.
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1. Introduction
Along with the growing academic interest in R&D cooperation (see e.g. Spence, 
1984; d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992), the policy 
regulations aimed at promoting cooperation in R&D among firms have been 
widely introduced (in Europe, the United States, Japan among other countries or 
regions, see e.g. Cassiman, 2000; Horvath, 2001; Barajas et al., 2012). According 
to Marinucci (2012) the initial goal of many policy-makers in promoting R&D 
cooperation between enterprises was to increase (or at least maintain) international 
competitiveness of domestic firms and sectors (cf. e.g. the SEMATECH program 
in the United States aimed at advancing semiconductor manufacturing, ESPRIT 
program in Europe oriented at information technology development and transfer, 
or VLSI program in Japan focused on improving semiconductor technologies and 
circuits). In recent years, public programs addressing R&D are being however 
created to enhance the competitiveness of a given economic area (for example, 
the comprehensive EU Framework Program, for details, please see Marinucci, 
2012).
The European Commission has supported R&D cooperation among enterprises 
for many years (Geroski, 1993; van Wegberg, 1995; Cassiman, 2000; Georghiou, 
2001; Barajas et al., 2012). The European policy-makers claim that interfirm R&D 
cooperation allows to promote the exchange of know-how and technologies, to 
facilitate technical and economic progress, and to rationalise the manufacture and 
use of products that benefit consumers among others (Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 2659/2000). The significant role of cooperation in R&D is clearly expressed 
in the EU2020 strategy which underlines the importance of properly linking 
different areas of European knowledge systems, i.e. innovation, research and higher 
education (Maassen and Stensaker, 2011). In Europe it is widely recognized that the 
relations and synergies between innovation, research and higher education are the 
main drivers of the knowledge economy (Veugelers and Mrak, 2009).
The European Union has set up special institutions aimed at promoting cooperation 
in European R&D. The flagship example may be here the European Institute of 
Innovation and Technology (EIT) which provides an important bridging function 
in Horizon 2020 from excellence-driven higher education, research and technology 
to innovation (eit.europa.eu). The EIT strives to fully integrate three sides of the 
knowledge triangle which encompasses innovation, research and higher education 
(for details, please see Soriano and Mulatero, 2010; Maassen and Stensaker, 2011).
Several governments have also stimulated the formation of R&D cooperation 
between enterprises by providing more lenient antitrust rules (Marinucci, 2012). 
For instance, the American legal acts (cf. National Cooperative Research Act) state 
that all enterprises willing to cooperate in research and development that file in a 
national register will be evaluated by antitrust authorities under the rule of reason 
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rather than the per se rule (Marinucci, 2012). Therefore, it seems quite natural to 
ask whether such policy direction is justified or not.
In recent years, the important questions about the potential harmful side-effects 
of R&D cooperation between enterprises are posed (see e.g. Martin, 2006; 
Miyagiwa, 2009; Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010; Prokop and Karbowski, 2013). 
The burning question arises whether the facilitation of cooperation among firms at 
the R&D stage may lead to the formation of a cartel on the final product market, 
what eventually can exert negative effects on the consumer surplus (Prokop and 
Wiśnicki, 2015). Can R&D cooperation between enterprises be a steppingstone 
to collusion on the final product market? It remains the central question to the 
following research.
The purpose of this research is to examine how R&D cooperation between firms 
influences the incentives to create a cartel in the final product market. We consider a 
case when the R&D expenditures reduce the unit costs of production and at the same 
time generate positive externalities for competitors (a case of process innovations 
generating knowledge spillovers will be here considered). The R&D investments 
of one enterprise create positive externalities for the other firms in the industry by 
helping them decrease their costs of production (similar approach can be found e.g. 
in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988, Kamien et al., 1992, see also Geroski, 1995 
for a wider discussion on knowledge spillovers in the industry). We hypothesize that 
under such market setup, the tightening of cooperation in research and development 
between competitors creates incentives for them to fully cartelize the industry.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. In the next section, the review of 
relevant literature is present. In section 3, the model of a noncooperative duopoly 
(there is no cartel neither in R&D, nor in the final product market), and industry-
wide cartel is developed. The model considers three cases. The first case focuses 
on the industry characterized by the Stackelberg leadership in the product market. 
The second case looks at the price leadership form of competition. The third case 
concentrates on the conduct (as well as performance) of companies that formed 
a cartel in the final product market and at the same time coordinated their R&D 
expenditures. Section 4 contains numerical data which constitute the solution to the 
model. Based on the comparison of the above-mentioned three cases, the incentives 
for the enterprises to invest in technology enhancements (process innovations) 
and to create a cartel in the product market are discussed in section 5. Conclusions 
(drawn in section 6) close the paper.
2. Literature review
According to Amir and colleagues (2001) R&D cooperation between firms is a 
particularly active area of research in the field of industrial economics. Pioneered 
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by Larry E. Ruff (1969), the theoretical literature on R&D cooperation between 
enterprises had a forceful take-off after a 15-year dormant time, following the 
research by Spence (1984), Katz (1986), d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), 
Kamien and colleagues (1992), Salant and Shaffer (1998; 1999), Amir and 
colleagues (2000; 2001), Kamien and Zang (2000), Petrakis and Poyago-Theotoky 
(2002), Atallah (2005), Cellini and Lambertini (2009), Bourreau and Dogan 
(2010), Bandyopadhyay and Mukherjee (2014), Czarnitzki and colleagues (2015), 
and Bourreau and colleagues (2016), among others. According to Amir and 
colleagues (2001) this strand of industrial economics literature may be viewed as a 
straightforward extension of the heated debate, initiated by Joseph A. Schumpeter 
(1942), on the relationship between market structure and enterprise innovation. 
R&D cooperation between enterprises constitutes a specific organizational/market 
structure that encompasses cooperation of firms in research and development and at 
the same time fierce competition (rivalry) between companies in the final product 
market (Kamien et al., 1992).
However, in recent years some researchers suggest that interfirm R&D cooperation 
can in fact serve a collusive function (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010; Sovinsky and 
Helland, 2012). As a result, enterprises cooperating in research and development 
may collude on the product market to the detriment of social welfare (Prokop and 
Wiśnicki, 2015). To our best knowledge, such possibility was first considered by 
Prokop and Karbowski (2013), but in the context of fairly similar enterprises (“a 
symmetric case”).
It is worth noting here that cartels are not necessarily formed among enterprises 
with fairly similar characteristics what at least to some extent substantiates the need 
of a consideration of an asymmetric case, in which a leader-follower relationship 
can be detected. The examples of historical market collusions show that the cartel 
members could significantly differ in size and/or market share. For instance, the 
district heating pipe cartel detected by the European Commission in 1995 consisted 
of ten enterprises with substantially different market shares (for details, please cf. 
Commission Decision Case IV/35.691/E-4).
A leader-follower relationship considered in the context of possible cartel formation 
on the final product market has been partly investigated and discussed in the 
economic literature (for a succinct review, please see Tirole, 1988). Shaffer (1995) 
provides a formal reasoning for the Stackelberg sequence (quantity leadership) in 
the context of cartel creation. Prokop (2014) compares the effects of the quantity 
leadership competition of two business firms on their R&D investments with the 
situation of a fully cartelized industry, under quadratic cost functions. A leader-
follower relationship in the context of cartel formation has been also analyzed 
within the price leadership models of competition discussed by d’Aspremont and 
colleagues (1983) and Donsimoni and colleagues (1986). However, none of these 
papers devoted to price leadership includes the role of process innovations and 
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knowledge spillovers in the context of cartel creation. The following paper aims to 
address the research gap delineated above.
Similarly to the previous literature on the topic (cf. e.g. d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 
1988; De Bondt and Veugelers, 1991), the following analysis is based on a two-
stage game with two enterprises as players. At the first game stage, the enterprises 
simultaneously decide upon the values of R&D expenditures, and at the second stage 
of the game, they compete in the final product market. Unlike the previous literature 
in the field, it has been assumed that in the case of no cartel agreement in the final 
product market, the enterprises compete according to the leadership model (both 
quantity leadership and price leadership are here considered and compared) what 
reflects the “asymmetric case”.
3. Model
Let us first focus on an industry comprised of two enterprises, labelled 1 and 2. 
Each enterprise i (i = 1, 2) produces qi units of a homogeneous good. The inverse 
market demand for the good is given as a linear function in the following form:
p = a – Q, (1)
where p stands for the market price, Q = q1 + q2 constitutes the volume of total 
production in the industry, while a (a > 0) is a given parameter. Let us further 
consider the production costs of enterprise i in the form of the following quadratic 
function:
, (2)
where c (c < a) constitutes a parameter of an initial efficiency of a given enterprise, 
xi stands for R&D expenditures made by the enterprise i, and xj denotes the R&D 
investments made by i’s rival. Parameter β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1) determines the size of 
knowledge spillovers (Geroski, 1995) in the industry, i.e. the benefits for a given 
enterprise obtained as a result of research and development undertaken by the 
enterprise’s rival. Higher value of β means that the R&D investments made by 
one company exert a larger impact on manufacturing cost reduction of the rival. 
In contrast to the seminal papers in the field, i.e. d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 
(1988) and Kamien and colleagues (1992), the total costs of production are here 
considered as quadratic what implies the existence of the increasing marginal costs 
of production and makes our model more externally valid.
Following d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) approach, it is further assumed 
that each company i incurs the costs of research and development according to the 
following quadratic function:
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,  (3)
where γ (γ > 0) constitutes a given parameter. Such specification of the R&D costs 
allows to model diminishing returns to R&D spendings that occur in business 
practice. The entry barriers to the industry are viewed as too high for new 
enterprises to enter.
There are two decision stages in our model. At the first stage, both companies 
simultaneously select their research expenditure levels, xi. These decisions directly 
affect the values of manufacturing costs of each enterprise according to formula 2. 
At the second stage, the enterprises compete in the final product market and behave 
according to one of the leadership forms (quantity or price leadership) discussed 
below.
Let us first consider the case when the industry competition is characterized by 
the quantity leadership in the final product market. Assume that company 1 plays 
the role of the Stackelberg leader, and company 2 plays the role of the Stackelberg 
follower. Company 1 is then the first to set its level of production, q1, and company 
2, knowing the supply level determined by the leader, decides upon its own level of 
production, q2.
Let us next find the subgame perfect equilibrium of this two-stage game. In order 
to do that we first consider the profit of the Stackelberg follower at the second stage 
of the game (for a given value of research expenditures made by both companies, x1 
and x2): = ( ) − . (4)
Given the production level of the leader company, q1, the follower maximizes its 
own profit by setting the output level at:= ))  , (5)
which is computed by solving the first order condition ( = 0) with respect to q2. 
Please note that formula 5 constitutes the reaction function of the follower firm in 
our duopoly market. Considering further the reaction function of the follower, the 
leader maximizes its own profit for given values of R&D expenditures made by 
both enterprises, x1 and x2:= ( ) −
 
(6)
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Please observe that the profit function given by formula 6 can be rearranged as a 
function of one variable only, i.e., q1:= )) − − . (7)
Next, the first order condition for profit optimization, = 0, generates the optimal 
supply level for the leader company:= ( ) )( )   (8)
By substituting (8) into (5), we obtain next the optimal production of the follower:
= ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )    (9)
It is worth stressing here that the outputs q1 and q2 given by (8) and (9), constitute 
the so called Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium of the game for given levels of research 
investments made by both companies, x1 and x2.
Next, after substituting (8) and (9) into (4) and (7), we obtain the profits of each 
enterprise, π1 and π2, as the functions of R&D investments made by both leader 
and follower, x1 and x2. Now, we can easily find the profit-maximizing values of 
R&D spendings of both companies. In the first stage of the game, when companies 
simultaneously decide upon their research spendings, x1 and x2, the Nash 
equilibrium strategies are obtained as a solution to the following set of equations in 
two unknowns, x1 and x2:= 0, i = 1, 2 (10)
Let us denote the solution of the above system of equations by x*1 and x*2. Substituting 
the calculated values of R&D investments made by companies into (8) and (9), we 
obtain next the equilibrium levels of output for the leader company and the follower 
company, q*1 and q*2 . From formula 1, we receive the equilibrium price, p*. Now, we 
can also find the equilibrium levels of profits, π*1 and π
*
2. Using numerical analysis, we 
consider the case of a = 100, c = 1, and y = 150. The received equilibrium results for 
various levels of parameter β (various levels of knowledge spillovers) are summarized 
in table 1 in section 4 devoted to data analysis.
Let us next focus on the case when the competition of enterprises in the final 
product market is characterized by price leadership. Please assume that company 1 
plays here the role of the price leader, and company 2, is the price follower (price-
taker). Firm 1 is then the one to set the price level, p, and firm 2, takes that price as 
given, and further decides upon its level of output, q2, at that price. Again, we look 
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for a subgame perfect equilibrium of the above duopoly game. In order to find this 
equilibrium, we first consider the profit of the follower company at the second stage 





Taking the price, p, set by the leader firm, as given, the follower maximizes its own 
profit by setting the production level at:) (12)
which can be computed by solving the first order condition, = 0,with respect to 
q2.
Given the reaction function of company 2 to the price level, the residual demand for 
the firm 1 is: (p) = a− ( ).   (13)
The firm 1’s profit function can be expressed as:
− . (14)
Now, taking into account the residual demand function from formula 13, the 
leader’s profit can be presented in the following form:
( )]− ( )] . (15)
The first order condition for the profit maximization of the leader enterprise would be:)   = 0,   i = 1, 2.
For given R&D expenditures made by both players, x1 and x2, the profit-maximizing 
price is received as the solution to the above first order condition with respect to p. 
Let us denote the resulting solution as p(x1, x2). By substituting p = p(x1, x2) into (13) 
and (12), we can easily obtain the levels of each firm’s supply as functions of x1 and 
x2. Please denote them as q1(x1, x2) and  q2(x1, x2), respectively. Next, by substituting 
p = p(x1, x2) and q1 = q1(x1, x2) as well as q2 = q2(x1, x2) into (15) and (11), we receive 
the optimal levels of profits for given values of x1 and x2. Let us denote them as 
π1(x1, x2) and π2(x1, x2).
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Now, please look back at the first stage of the game, when companies simultaneously 
decide upon their R&D investments, x1 and x2. The Nash equilibrium strategies of 
both firms can be obtained as a solution to the following set of equations in two 
unknowns, x1 and x2:)   = 0,   i = 1, 2. (16)
Please denote the solution of the above set of equations as xˆ1 and xˆ2. Now, by 
substituting the computed values of R&D investments into the expressions q1(x1, x2), 
q2(x1, x2) and p = p(x1, x2), we obtain the equilibrium levels of output for the leader 
company and the follower firm, and also the equilibrium price. Please denote them 
by qˆ1, qˆ2, and pˆ, respectively. Using formulas 15 and 11, we can next calculate the 
equilibrium levels of profits of our duopolists, denoted by πˆ1 and πˆ2. The equilibrium 
results for various levels of parameter β are shown in table 2 in section 4 devoted to 
data analysis.
Next we are going to consider the case, in which both firms have colluded in 
research and development, as well as in the final product market. As in the previous 
case, we proceed here by turning to backward induction. In the second game stage, 
the enterprises select their final production levels, q1 and q2, for given values of 
R&D expenditures, x1 and x2:( ) /( ) /( ) . (17)
Note that at the symmetric equilibrium, when x1 = x2 = x, the profit-maximizing 
supply level for each enterprise, q = q1 = q2, can be received by solving the 
following optimality condition with respect to q:= 0.  (18)
By solving expression 18, we get:=
 
.  (19)
Next, we can substitute formula 19 into the inverse market demand function given 
by formula 1, and, as a result, we get the equilibrium price for the final product as a 
function of x:
.  (20)
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Observe that in the first stage of the game, when each enterprise selects the R&D 
expenditures, x, the enterprises’ joint profit can be expressed as:
 
.  (21)
Since in our model the cartel members share the joint profit equally, each of them 
earns = .
The next step in our analysis is to compute the levels of R&D expenditures that 
optimize cartel profits. Therefore, we solve the following first order condition with 
respect to x:
 = 0.  (22)
Please accept that the received value of R&D expenditures made by each enterprise 
in the cartelized industry is here denoted by x~. Next, after substituting x~ for x into 
formulas 19 and 20, we can easily find the optimal supply level of each company, 
q~, and the equilibrium market price, p~, respectively. On the basis of (21), we may 
next compute the joint profit of cartel firms, π~. We can further find the individual 
profit of enterprise i as π~ = π~i/2. Using numerical analysis, we consider the same set 
of values of parameters, i.e. a = 100, c = 1, and γ = 150. The received equilibrium 
results for various values of parameter β are summarized in table 3 in section 4 
devoted to data analysis.
4. Empirical data and analysis
As indicated above, in this section we are going to present numerical data which 
constitute solutions to all three cases considered in our model.
Based on table 1 regarding Stackelberg competition, we may observe the impact 
of parameter β, i.e. the size of knowledge spillovers in the industry, on the 
equilibrium behaviour of enterprises. Please observe that the R&D expenditures 
of companies decline with the increasing scale of knowledge spillovers (growing 
β) in the industry. The relative research spendings of the follower firm are lower, 
and they decline significantly faster than the R&D investments of the leader 
company. For β = 0, the ratio of investments is approximately 1.2, and for β = 
1 it becomes as much as 3.5. Please bear in mind that, following Kamien and 
colleagues (1992), the research joint venture (RJV) is characterized by β = 1, 
since companies in RJV completely share their knowledge and fully disclose their 
information.
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Table 1: Stackelberg equilibrium for a = 100, c = 1, γ = 150, and β ∈ [0,1]
β x*1  x*2  q*1  q*2  p*  π*1  π*2
0.0 1.208440 1.04283 29.7334 23.5870 46.6796 878.101 747.128
0.1 1.125290 0.94592 29.7804 23.6302 46.5894 892.967 762.544
0.2 1.050060 0.855727 29.7805 23.6574 46.5620 904.666 775.686
0.3 0.981520 0.77065 29.7350 23.6704 46.5946 913.650 787.058
0.4 0.918817 0.689332 29.6436 23.6702 46.6862 920.208 797.038
0.5 0.861418 0.610528 29.5045 23.6578 46.8377 924.496 805.929
0.6 0.809137 0.532985 29.3142 23.6340 47.0518 926.542 813.989
0.7 0.762224 0.455270 29.0670 23.6001 47.3329 926.231 821.469
0.8 0.721606 0.375487 28.7540 23.5587 47.6872 923.246 828.658
0.9 0.689457 0.290665 28.3608 23.5154 48.1237 916.921 835.976
1.0 0.670688 0.195237 27.8614 23.4837 48.6549 905.838 844.183
Source: Authors’ calculations
For the values of parameter β higher than 0.3, an increase in the size of knowledge 
spillovers leads to a lower supply of the final product by both enterprises. Each 
company supplies the lowest amount of the final product when the research joint 
venture is formed (β = 1), which results in the highest market price. Thus, a research 
joint venture will also lead to the lowest consumer surplus.
Note also that the profit of each company is affected by the parameter β value 
in different ways. On the one hand, the profit of the follower company increases 
monotonically with a wider extent of knowledge spillovers, and achieves its 
maximum when the companies form a research joint venture. On the other hand, 
the leader company profit initially grows when the parameter β increases, but it 
starts declining when this parameter value exceeds 0.6. Thus, it seems that under 
the Stackelberg competition in the final product market, a research joint venture is 
beneficial to the follower firm, but not much attractive to the leader, who prefers 
only a medium level of knowledge spillovers.
Let us now turn to the price leadership competition. Based on table 2, it is now 
possible to describe the impact of knowledge spillovers on the equilibrium 
conduct and performance of enterprises when the competition in the final product 
market can be captured by the price-leadership model. First, please observe that 
a larger extent of knowledge spillovers (increasing β) leads to the reduction of 
R&D expenditures by both companies. Second, the price leader invests more 
in R&D than the follower for β ≤ 0.7, but for the higher levels of knowledge 
spillovers, the follower’s investment spendings become larger than those made by 
the leader.
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Table 2: Price-leadership equilibrium for a = 100, c = 1, γ = 150, and β ∈ [0,1]
β xˆ1 xˆ2 qˆ1 qˆ2 pˆ πˆ1 πˆ2
0.0 1.086440 0.660528 26.6352 33.2805 40.0843 639.105 634.291
0.1 0.941921 0.579159 26.0632 33.6810 40.2558 642.980 652.771
0.2 0.810830 0.506542 25.5190 33.8776 40.6034 646.278 668.528
0.3 0.690058 0.441240 24.9884 33.8897 41.1219 649.226 682.203
0.4 0.577397 0382520 24.4605 33.7297 41.8099 651.919 694,142
0.5 0.471199 0.330252 23.9281 33.4050 42.6669 654.383 704.464
0.6 0.370063 0.287930 23.3877 32.9208 43.6914 656.623 713.090
0.7 0.272404 0.247890 22.8409 32.2805 44.8786 658.690 719.743
0.8 0.175575 0.221946 22.2970 31.4843 46.2187 660.815 723.887
0.9 0.073599 0.213405 21.7806 30.5195 47.6999 663.708 724.473
1.0 0.000000 0.208378 21.4818 29.5725 48.9458 669.552 720.467
Source: Authors’ calculations
The quantity of the final product offered by the price leader is lower than the supply 
of the follower, and it declines with the growing level of the knowledge spillovers. 
Please observe that the quantity of the final product offered by the price follower 
is a non-monotonic function of the size of knowledge spillovers, i.e., this output 
increases when parameter β is below 0.3, and declines when β is above that level. 
Each firm’s output reaches the lowest levels when the research joint venture is 
formed, i.e., β = 1. The equilibrium market price is an increasing function of the 
knowledge spillovers. The highest price of the final product is observed in the case 
of research joint venture.
The profit of the price leader is an increasing function of knowledge spillovers. 
The profit of the price follower is also growing with larger β, but it suddenly starts 
declining when β ≥ 0.9. Thus, when the competition in the final product market 
is characterized by price leadership, a research joint venture benefits the leader 
company, but is less attractive to the follower enterprise. According to table 2, the 
price follower prefers the knowledge spillovers to be at the level of β = 0.9. Finally, 
it should also be stressed that the profit of the price leader is greater than the profit 
of the follower only when there are no knowledge spillovers (β = 0). For β ≥ 0.1, 
the follower’s profit is larger than the profit of the price leader. Next, we move on to 
analyze the case of interfirm cooperation within a cartel.
Finally, let us now turn to the equilibrium in a cartelized industry. Using table 3, 
we can analyze the impact of knowledge spillovers on the equilibrium conduct of 
our companies. For a start, it is worth stressing that in a fully cartelized industry 
the value of the R&D investments of companies changes non-monotonically. The 
lowest values of R&D expenditures occur when there are no knowledge spillovers, 
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or when the enterprises create a research joint venture (β = 1). The highest levels of 
R&D spendings are in turn expected for the medium levels of knowledge spillovers 
(β = 0.8) in the industry.
Table 3: Equilibrium of a cartelized industry for a = 100, c = 1, γ = 150, and β ∈ [0,1]
β x~ q~i p~ π~i
0.0 0.792684 19.5479 60.9042 930.268
0.1 0.805241 19.7606 60.4788 939.399
0.2 0.814591 19.9546 60.0908 947.964
0.3 0.821450 20.1356 59.7356 956.001
0.4 0.826356 20.2953 59.4095 963.548
0.5 0.829717 20.4456 59.1089 970.646
0.6 0.831846 20.5845 58.8309 977.329
0.7 0.832988 20.7134 58.5732 983.631
0.8 0.833333 20.8333 58.3333 989.583
0.9 0.833033 20.9452 58.1096 995.214
1.0 0.832210 21.0498 57.9004 1000.550
Source: Authors’ calculations
Moreover, it seems interesting that in the equilibrium discussed, a larger size of 
knowledge spillovers makes each company manufacture a higher value of the final 
output. It certainly leads to a price reduction, but, we should underline here, the 
prices are still significantly higher than in the non-collusive (competitive) case. The 
profits earned by each cartel enterprise are monotonically rising together with a 
growing size of knowledge spillovers.
5. Results and discussion
In this section we are going to discuss the results received in the previous section 
of the paper. In particular, we are going to compare the decisions of companies to 
enhance the production technology, as well as assess the incentives of enterprises to 
cartelize the market.
First, let us focus on the decisions of enterprises to undertake the R&D investments. 
It is worth stressing that for any level of knowledge spillovers in the industry, the 
Stackelberg leader spends more on research and development than any firm in the 
market characterized by the price leadership rivalry. Observe further that in the case 
of relatively low knowledge spillovers in the industry (β ≤ 0.5), the Stackelberg 
leader invests more in research and development than a cartel enterprise. The 
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Stackelberg follower invests more in R&D than the price leader for β ≥ 0.1, and 
that investment is larger than the R&D spendings of the price follower for β < 
1. The quantity follower spends more on research and development than a cartel 
enterprise, however only for β ≤ 0.2.
Now, let us turn to the case of relatively large knowledge spillovers in the industry 
(β ≥ 0.6). Note that the process innovation investments made by each enterprise 
operating in a cartel are higher than the R&D expenditures made by a firm 
competing in an industry characterized by the leadership behavior. When a research 
joint venture is formed, the enterprises participating in a cartel undertake higher 
R&D investments than the non-colluding companies. It is worth noting here that a 
similar result has been obtained by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) in the case 
of linear production cost functions and the Cournot-type competition in the final 
product market.
Next, please focus on the price level of the final product. Observe that despite the 
more efficient production process, the cartel companies offer their final product at a 
significantly higher price to consumers than the non-colluding enterprises. Further, 
the simulations show that, for any size of knowledge spillovers in the industry, 
the lowest market prices of the final product are expected when the industry is 
characterized by price leadership competition. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the 
consumers, the price leadership rivalry is here a better type of competition than the 
quantity leadership.
Finally, let us also consider the firm performance in each of the cases analyzed 
in previous sections. Independently of the level of knowledge spillovers in the 
industry, the profits of enterprises in the market characterized by price leadership 
are lower than the profits obtained by the firms behaving according to the 
Stackelberg model of duopoly. Thus, the non-colluding firms would prefer here 
the quantity leadership to the price leadership. The best performance is achieved 
however under the collusive behavior. No matter the extent of knowledge spillovers 
in the industry, the profit of a cartel member is higher than the profit of any firm 
in the non-cartelized industry characterized by the quantity leadership, or price 
leadership. What is more, the enterprises attain the highest profits when they create 
a cartel both at the R&D and production stage, and at the same time form a research 
joint venture to fully benefit from the mutual knowledge exchange. We may 
therefore expect that the tightening of cooperation in research and development can 
create sufficient incentives for the enterprises to cartelize the market. This original 
result seems to shed some unfavorable light on the R&D cooperation itself, which 
is widely believed to promote enterprise innovation and increase social welfare (cf. 
e.g. d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992; Kaiser, 2002; Becker 
and Dietz, 2004).
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6. Conclusions
On the basis of formal analyses presented in the previous sections, we can conclude 
that the best performance of enterprises (in terms of profits generated) is achieved 
under the collusive behavior. Independently of the size of knowledge spillovers 
in the industry, the profit of a firm participating in the cartel is higher than the 
profit of any company in the non-cartelized market characterized by any form of 
the leadership behavior. Moreover, the firms earn the highest profits when they 
coordinate both their R&D efforts and production decisions as cartel members, and 
at the same time operate in a research joint venture to maximize the knowledge 
exchange. This result supports our working hypothesis that the tightening of 
cooperation in research and development between market rivals creates incentives 
for the enterprises to cartelize the industry. But, if really R&D cooperation between 
market competitors strengthens firms’ incentives to behave cooperatively also in 
the final product market (and this is a claim suggested in this paper), the industrial 
policy oriented at promoting R&D cooperation (which is nowadays quite common 
worldwide) could be, at least to some extent, counterproductive (it may in fact 
work in favor of collusion in the final product market and hence reduction rather 
than increase of the social welfare). Please bear in mind that the last prediction 
is supported by the empirical evidence (cf. literature review section). Our paper 
is theoretical in nature, and all our claims are based on formal reasoning and 
simulations. Certainly, it constitutes a limitation of the above study, but at the same 
time it delineates the future research which should empirically test the theoretical 
predictions produced in this paper.
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Aktivnosti istraživanja i razvoja poduzeća, vodstvo tržišta proizvoda  
i koluzija
Adam Karbowski1, Jacek Prokop2
Sažetak
Svrha ovog istraživanja je usporediti posljedice, prvo, kvantitativnog vodstva i, 
drugo, cjenovnog vodstva u konkurenciji duopola na njihova ulaganja u 
istraživanje i razvoj u situaciji industrije s obilježjima kartela. Pokazalo se da 
primjenom pristupa teorije igre i numeričke analize pod kvantitativnim vodstvom, 
ulaganja u istraživanje i razvoj poduzeća padaju s rastućim prelijevanjem znanja 
u industriji. Primjenom Stackelbergova modela duopola, utvrđujemo da je razlika  
između poduzeća koja slijedi i vodećeg poduzeća u tome da su relativni izdaci za 
istraživanje i razvoj sljedbenika značajno niži i brže se smanjuju od ulaganja 
vodećeg poduzeća u istraživanje i razvoj. Svako poduzeće određuje najnižu 
vrijednost konačnog proizvoda kada se formira zajedničko ulaganje, što također 
rezultira najvećom tržišnom cijenom. Pod cjenovnim vodstvom, veće prelijevanje 
znanja u industriji dovodi do smanjenja izdataka za istraživanje i razvoj za oba 
poduzeća. Najviša cijena konačnog proizvoda utvrđuje se kada se osnuje 
zajedničko ulaganje za istraživanje. U industriji udruženoj u kartele dolazi do 
najnižih vrijednosti izdataka za istraživanje i razvoj kada nema prelijevanja znanja 
između poduzeća ili kada osnuju zajedničko ulaganje u fazi istraživanja i razvoja. 
Najveće vrijednosti ulaganja u istraživanje i razvoj promatraju se za srednje 
vrijednosti prelijevanja znanja. Iz provedene analize može se zaključiti da se 
pojačanjem suradnje u istraživanju i razvoju između konkurenata stvaraju poticaji 
da u potpunosti kreiraju tržište s obilježjima kartela.
Ključne riječi: suradnja u istraživanju i razvoju, prelijevanje znanja, poticaji za 
kartelizaciju tržišta, kvantitativno vodstvo, cjenovno vodstvo
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